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1. Introduction
The allocation of trial costs and the way a trial evolves are two important issues in civil 
procedure. With regard to the allocation of costs, in some countries each party pays virtually
all of her litigation costs herself.  In the United States for example, the losing party bears the 
court costs but not the lawyer fees of her opponent. This rule is often called the “American 
rule”. In other countries, the successful party at trial can recover all or at least a part of his 
lawyer fees from the unsuccessful party.  This rule is often called the “British rule” or the 
“English rule”.1  Concerning the way a trial evolves, a dispute often involves multiple issues. 
For example, it is not unusual that parties disagree about some substantive issue and also
about the court’s jurisdiction (over the matter or the defendant).   Likewise, the plaintiff and 
the defendant may disagree about the liability issue and the exact amount of damages. Also, 
the defendant may raise a counterclaim in response to the plaintiff’s claim.  The law can deal 
with multiple issues in basically two ways.2 First, it can dictate that courts should decide all 
issues at the same time. In other words, courts are then obliged to let the parties litigate all 
issues before making any decision.  This is called a “unitary trial”.3  Second, the law could 
allow courts to let the parties litigate one issue after the other and decide on each issue after 
the parties have litigated it. The parties thus litigate “issue 1” after which the court makes a 
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2decision about “issue 1”.  Then, if still necessary, the parties litigate “issue 2” after which the 
court makes a decision about “issue 2”, and so forth. This is called a “sequential trial”.4 In 
many countries courts have wide opportunities to separate issues at trial. The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure give US courts different possibilities for sequential decision making. For 
example, Rule 42 states that “the court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or 
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial 
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of 
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always 
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States”. In the UK, according to Rule 
3.1(2)e of the Civil Procedure Rules, the court may direct that part of any proceedings (such 
as a counterclaim) be dealt with as separate proceedings. According to Rule 3.1(2) i and j, the 
court can direct a separate trial of any issue and decide the order in which issues are to be 
tried. 
This article studies sequential litigation in conjunction with the English rule. Although 
the English rule has been examined rather thoroughly in the economic literature5 and 
sequential litigation also has received some attention6, they have never been examined 
together. The prior literature compares unitary litigation under the American rule with 
sequential litigation under the American rule. The most important results from this literature 
are that sequential litigation (1) Lowers the expected cost of litigation for both parties 
compared to a unitary trial.  The intuition behind this result is simple. In a sequential trial, the 
parties avoid litigation on subsequent issues if the defendant wins the current issue. For 
example, if the defendant is not held liable, the trial ends and the parties do not have to make 
costs to prove the exact amount of damages; (2) Increases the plaintiff’s incentive to sue and 
so increases the number of lawsuits. This follows straight from (1). When suing becomes 
cheaper, more cases will be filed; (3) Reduces the likelihood that the parties will settle out of 
                                               
4 Ibid., p. 100.
5 For an overview, see Hughes, J.W. and Snyder, E.A. (1998), ‘Allocation of litigation costs: American and 
English rules’, in Newman, P. (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, London, 
Macmillan, 1998, p. 51-56.; see also Katz, A.W. (2000), ‘Indemnity of legal fees’, in B. Bouckaert and G. De 
Geest (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar,  p. 63-94.
6 Landes, W., ‘Sequential versus unitary trials : an economic analysis’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies, 1993, p. 99-
134.  For an earlier, less systematic analysis, see Schwartz, W., ‘Severence – a means of minimizing the role of 
burden and expense in determining the outcome of litigation’. 20 Vanderbilt Law Review, 1967, p. 1197-1213.  
For an analysis of sequential trials with one-sided private information, see Chen, K-P., Chien, J-K. and Chu, 
C.Y., ‘Sequential versus unitary trials with asymmetric information’. 26 Journal of Legal Studies, 1997, p. 239-
258.
3court by narrowing the range of mutually acceptable settlements. Once again, this follows 
straight from the cost savings discussed in (1). Since a trial becomes less costly for the 
plaintiff, he will ask for a higher settlement amount. And since a trial also becomes less costly 
for the defendant, the maximum settlement amount he’s willing to give decreases. The 
settlement range thus gets smaller with more trials as a result;  (4) Has an ambiguous effect on 
the settlement amount, since the expected value of the plaintiff increases and the expected loss 
of the defendant decreases.7
In this article, I examine the influence of sequential litigation when the loser at trial 
pays all the litigation costs and compare the results with (a) the situation in which litigation is 
unitary and the loser pays all the litigation costs and (b) the situation in which litigation is 
sequential and each party bears his own costs. I focus on the incentive to sue, the incentive to 
settle (or to litigate) and on the settlement amount. I find some interesting differences with the 
previous literature. First, sequential litigation does not increase the incentive to sue for all 
disputes under the English rule. More specifically, unlike under the American rule, under the 
English rule one has to make a distinction between two types of disputes for which sequential 
litigation is possible. In the first type, the judge litigates and decides a subsequent issue, part 
of plaintiff’s claim, conditional on the plaintiff winning all previous issues. An example is a 
trial in which the parties first litigate the liability issue and then, if the plaintiff wins this issue, 
the damages issue. I will call this a “type I sequential trial”.  In the second type, the parties
litigate and the judge decides the defendant’s counterclaim, conditional on the plaintiff losing 
his own claim. I call this a “type II sequential trial”.  In other words, these trials concern 
counterclaims which the defendant can only win if the plaintiff loses his own claim.8 An 
example would be a counterclaim that the plaintiff has infringed a trademark when the 
plaintiff claims that the trademark is void. The defendant can only win his counterclaim if the 
judge decides that the trademark is not void. Another example is a counterclaim for damages 
when the defendant is convinced that the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous. The defendant can only 
win the counterclaim if the plaintiff loses his claim. In contrast with the American rule, I find 
that the plaintiff’s incentive to sue only increases for type I sequential trials and not for type II
sequential trials. Second, I find that sequential litigation also decreases the incentive to settle 
under the English rule. Perhaps rather surprisingly, the decrease is larger under the American 
rule than under the English rule. Third, the effect of sequential litigation on the settlement 
amount is not ambiguous under the English rule. In contrast to the American rule, it is 
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4perfectly predictable whether the parties will settle for more or for less when parties litigate 
sequentially.  
I will proceed as follows. Section 2 analyzes type I sequential trials. I make an 
informal and a formal analysis and compare the results with sequential litigation under the 
American rule. In section 3, I do the same for type II sequential trials. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Type I sequential trials 
2.1. Assumptions
I adopt the following assumptions: both parties are risk neutral, the plaintiff only sues if the 
expected value of litigating his claim is positive, to file and settle a lawsuit is costless, the 
parties know whether a trial will be sequential, the party’s litigation expenditures are fixed, 
the parties may have different expectations about the probability of prevailing and there are 
no ‘diseconomies of scope’ from separating issues at trial.9 Furthermore, I will only examine 
situations in which the parties expect to litigate (not settle) issue ‘2’ in a sequential trial and 
do not settle part of the claim in a unitary trial.10  Next, the parties do not have different 
information (no asymmetric information). Also, the timing (sequence) of litigating the several 
issues is fixed. Finally, I study the “pure English rule”. Under such a rule, the loser at trial (1) 
bears all the trial costs of the winning party and (2) bears all the trial costs, even if he wins 
one or more issues (but still loses the claim).
2.2. Informal analysis
For type I trials, sequential litigation under the English rule increases the expected value for 
the plaintiff and thus his incentive to sue. The defendant’s expected loss however remains the 
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5same. The intuition is as follows. Suppose the plaintiff’s claim involves two issues.11 A 
sequential trial may save the costs of litigating the second issue because the plaintiff can drop 
his claim when he loses the first issue. If the plaintiff loses the first issue, he avoids paying all 
the trial costs of the second issue, given that the loser pays all. On the contrary, the defendant 
is indifferent between a unitary and a sequential trial.  If the plaintiff loses the first issue, the 
plaintiff will lose the trial and not only pay his own trial costs but also those of the defendant, 
just like in a unitary trial.12 So litigating sequentially does not advantage the defendant 
compared to a unitary trial. The advantage is completely concentrated on the side of the 
plaintiff, since he is the one that bears all the costs when he loses the first issue. 
From the discussion above it is straightforward to see how a sequential trial will 
influence the settlement frequency and the settlement amount. Compared to a unitary trial, the 
plaintiff wants to receive a higher settlement amount but the defendant is not willing to give 
anything extra. The scope for settlement thus reduces. The influence on the settlement amount 
is unambiguous: it increases because sequential litigation only benefits the plaintiff. 
UNITARY TRIAL                                          TYPE I SEQUENTIAL TRIAL
               STAGE 1+STAGE 2                                                                  STAGE 1
                                                                                       Plaintiff                            Plaintiff
                                                                                             wins                                        loses
                                                                                  STAGE 2                                  END
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62.3. Formal analysis
I will use the following notations: 
pa, pb: plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of probability of plaintiff winning issue ‘1’
qa, qb: plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of probability of plaintiff winning issue ‘2’  
J : the damage award  if the plaintiff wins both issues
a1, b1: plaintiff’s and defendant’s cost of trial for issue ‘1’
a2, b2 : plaintiff’s and defendant’s cost of trial for issue ‘2’
Va, Vb : plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of expected value of litigation in a sequential 
trial
Va(u), Vb(u) : plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of expected value of litigation in a unitary 
trial in which issue ‘1’ and issue ‘2’ are litigated together
In a sequential trial, A will sue if13
Va = paqaJ - pa(1-qa)(a1+b1+a2+b2) – (1-pa)(a1+b1)  0
If the plaintiff wins the first issue of his claim, the parties will litigate the second issue as well
(see the assumptions). If the plaintiff wins the second issue as well, he wins the claim, gets the 
award of J and bears no trial costs (loser pays). If he loses the second issue, he loses his claim, 
gets no award and pays all the trial costs. If the plaintiff loses the first issue, the second issue 
will not be litigated, but he will have to pay all the trial costs of the first issue.
B’s expected loss from litigation equals
Vb = pbqb(J + a1+b1+a2+b2)
If the plaintiff wins the first issue of his claim, the parties will litigate the second issue as well
(see the assumptions). If the plaintiff wins the second issue as well, he wins the claim and the 
defendant has to pay J to the plaintiff and bears all litigation costs. If the plaintiff loses the 
second issue after winning the first issue or loses the first issue (in which case the second
issue will not be litigated), the defendant does not have to pay J to the plaintiff and he does 
not have to pay any trial costs.
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7The parties settle the entire lawsuit before any issue is decided if Vb  Va or
(pbqb-paqa)(J + a1+b1+a2+b2) + a1+b1 + pa(a2+b2)  0 
In a unitary trial, A will sue if
Va(u) =  paqaJ -  pa(1-qa)(a1+b1+a2+b2) – (1-pa)(a1+b1+a2+b2)   0
In a unitary trial, both issues are always litigated. If the plaintiff wins both issues, he wins his 
claim and gets the award J. If he wins the first issue but loses the second, or if he loses the 
first issue (and either wins or loses the second issue), he loses his claim, gets no award and 
has to pay all trial costs.
B’s expected loss from litigation equals
Vb(u)  = pbqb(J + a1+b1+a2+b2)
If the plaintiff wins both issues, he wins his claim and the defendant has to pay the award J 
and all trial costs. If the plaintiff wins the first issue but loses the second, or if he loses the 
first issue (and either wins or loses the second issue), he loses his claim, in which case the 
defendant does not have to pay the award J and incurs no trial costs.
The parties settle the entire lawsuit before any issue is decided if Vb(u)   Va(u) or
(pbqb-paqa)(J +a1+b1+a2+b2) + a1+b1 + a2 + b2   0 
The added incentive to sue for A under sequential litigation equals 
Va-Va(u) = (1-pa)(a2+b2)
Sequential litigation benefits the plaintiff because he avoids the trial costs of the second issue 
(his own and those of the defendant) when he loses the first issue.
B’s expected loss remains the same under sequential litigation:
Vb-Vb(u) = 0
Sequential litigation does not benefit the defendant. When the plaintiff loses the first issue in a 
unitary trial, the defendant does not have to pay any trial costs connected to the second issue.
Sequential litigation decreases the settlement range with
Vb-Va – (Vb(u)-Va(u)) = (Vb-Vb(u))-(Va-Va(u))=-(1-pa)(a2+b2)
8Sequential litigation increases the plaintiff’s minimum settlement demand and does not 
influence the defendant’s maximum settlement offer. This narrows down the settlement range. 
The settlement amount must increase since the plaintiff expects to save costs but the 
defendant does not. 
2.4. Comparison with sequential litigation under the American rule
Under the American rule, both parties can save costs when they litigate sequentially. If the 
plaintiff loses the first issue, each party escapes bearing the trial costs of the second issue. 
Under the English rule, only the plaintiff saves costs. If he loses the first issue, he escapes 
bearing all the trial costs of the second issue because he will drop his claim after the first issue 
has been litigated. The defendant saves no costs because the plaintiff bears all the costs if he 
loses the first issue. As a consequence, the plaintiff’s incentive to sue increases under both the 
American and the English rule, but the increase is higher under the English rule.14
The settlement range decreases under both rules of cost allocation.  However, the 
decrease of the settlement range is smaller under the English rule than under the American 
rule. Intuitively, under the English rule the reduction of the settlement range only depends on 
how the plaintiff estimates his chances of losing the first issue (and thus avoids all trial costs 
of the second issue).  Under the American rule, the reduction depends on how each party
estimates that the plaintiff will lose the first issue (and each party avoids his own trial costs of 
the second issue). And since we are looking at situations in which the defendant estimates the 
chance that the plaintiff will lose the first issue higher than the plaintiff (1 – pa < 1 – pb or 
pa>pb15), the settlement range decreases more under the American rule.16 The fact that the 
settlement frequency decreases more under the American rule than under the English rule may 
be surprising at first. The economic theory of litigation has shown that the settlement 
frequency is higher under the American rule (at least when parties are risk neutral and 
expenditures are exogenous).17  I stress that this is still the case for sequential trials. What I 
have shown is that a switch from a unitary to a sequential trial decreases the settlement 
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9frequency most under the American rule, not that a switch from the American rule to the 
English rule increases the settlement frequency when litigation is sequential. 
While the influence of sequential litigation on the settlement amount is ambiguous 
under the American rule, this is not true under the English rule: it increases. The reason is that 
litigating sequentially saves costs for both parties under the American rule, while it only saves 
costs for the plaintiff under the English rule.  
Type I Sequential Trials
          AMERICAN RULE                                                               ENGLISH RULE
               STAGE 1                                                                                 STAGE 1
Plaintiff                  Plaintiff                                          Plaintiff                                  Plaintiff
wins                           loses                                               wins                                        loses
STAGE 2                    END                                             STAGE 2                                 END 
                            Plaintiff and defendant                                                              Plaintiff
                            avoid trial costs of stage 2                                                         avoids (all)
                                                                                                                                  trial costs 
                                                                                                                                  of stage 2.
3. Type II sequential trials18
3.1. Assumptions
I adopt the same assumptions as for type I sequential trials19 and add two assumptions: I focus 
on counterclaims which the defendant will find worthwhile to bring in a unitary as well as a 
                                               
18 For a general economic analysis of counterclaims, see Landes, W., ‘Counterclaims: an economic analysis’, 14 
International Review of Law and Economics, 1994, p. 235-244. 
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sequential trial20 and I assume that the defendant would not file his counterclaim in a separate 
suit if the plaintiff would not file his claim.21
3.2. Informal analysis
The situation of type 2 sequential trials is the mirror image of type I sequential trials. Here, 
litigating sequentially has no effect on the plaintiff’s expected value. The defendant’s 
expected loss however decreases. The intuition is as follows. A sequential trial may save the 
costs of litigating the counterclaim when the plaintiff wins his claim because the defendant 
can drop his counterclaim in that case (he can not win by definition).22  If the plaintiff wins 
his claim and the defendant drops his counterclaim, the defendant avoids paying all the trial 
costs of the counterclaim (given that the loser pays all). On the contrary, the plaintiff is 
indifferent between a unitary and a sequential trial. If the plaintiff wins his claim, the 
defendant will lose the counterclaim and pay all the trial costs associated with the 
counterclaim, just like in a unitary trial. So litigating sequentially does not advantage the 
plaintiff. The advantage is completely situated on the defendant’s side, since he is the one that 
bears all the costs of the counterclaim when the plaintiff wins his own claim. 
From the discussion above, it is straightforward to see how sequential litigation will 
influence the settlement frequency and the settlement amount. Compared to a unitary trial, the 
minimum offer the plaintiff wants to receive remains the same but the maximum offer the 
defendant is willing to give decreases.  The scope for settlement thus reduces. The influence 
on the settlement amount is unambiguous: it decreases since sequential litigation only benefits 
the defendant.
                                                                                                                                                  
19 Two of these assumptions need to be adjusted to the context of counterclaims: the defendant only 
counterclaims if the expected value of his counterclaim is positive and the parties expect to litigate (not settle) 
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in that otherwise there is no real difference between a unitary and a sequential trial.
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litigated). In such a case, sequential litigation can obviously decrease the plaintiff’s incentive to sue (since the 
defendant only counterclaims if litigation is sequential; the counterclaim reduces the plaintiff’s expected value).  
21 This is done merely for the sake of mathematical simplicity. Dropping this assumption would not change the 
results fundamentally.
22 When the plaintiff loses his claim, the parties go on to litigate the counterclaim in a sequential trial as well as 
in a unitary trial. By assumption the parties do not settle the counterclaim in a sequential trial. 
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UNITARY TRIAL                                                         SEQUENTIAL TRIAL
                STAGE 1+STAGE2                                                                 STAGE 1
                                                                                             Plaintiff                            Plaintiff
                                                                                           wins                                        loses
                                                                                     END                                 STAGE 2
3.3. Formal analysis
I will use the following notations:
paqa, pbqb: plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of probability of plaintiff winning his claim23
24
(1-pa)ra, (1-pb)rb : plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of probability of defendant winning 
his counterclaim
J: the damage award if the plaintiff wins his claim
K: the damage award if the defendant wins his counterclaim
a1, b1: plaintiff’s and defendant’s cost of trial for the plaintiff’s claim
a2, b2: plaintiff’s and defendant’s cost of trial for the defendant’s counterclaim if the 
counterclaim is tried in a sequential trial
                                               
23 Once again, paqa stands for pa x qa. 
24 I have chosen to divide the claim and the counterclaim into two issues to model the fact that the defendant can 
only win his counterclaim when the plaintiff loses his claim. Although claim and counterclaim each contain two 
issues, I assume these two issues are litigated in a unitary trial. This is done merely to focus on the separation of 
claim and counterclaim instead of separating issues of respectively claim and counterclaim. The consequences of 
separating issues from claim (and counterclaim) follow directly from the analysis of type I sequential trials.  
Further, I have divided claim and counterclaim into only two issues for reasons of simplicity (any number of 
issues is possible). 
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a, b :  plaintiff’s and defendant’s cost of trial when claim and counterclaim are tried together 
in a unitary trial (a=a1+b1, b=b1+b2)
Va, Vb: plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of expected value of litigation in a sequential 
trial
Va(u), Vb(u) : plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of expected value of litigation in a unitary 
trial.
In a sequential trial A will sue if
Va= paqaJ-pa(1-qa)(a1+b1)-(1-pa)ra(K+a1+a2+b1+b2)-(1-pa)(1-ra)(a1+b1)   0
If A wins both issues of his claim, he gets an award J, will not have to pay K (the defendant 
will not counterclaim because he knows he will lose) and pays no trial costs. If he wins the 
first issue of his claim but loses the second issue, he loses his claim, gets no award J, does not 
have to pay K (since the defendant will not file the counterclaim) and pays all trial costs of his 
claim. If he loses the first issue, he can not win his own claim and the defendant will win his 
counterclaim with probability ra, in which case the plaintiff has to pay the amount of K and 
all trial costs for claim and counterclaim, and will lose his counterclaim with probability 1-ra, 
in which case the plaintiff only incurs all trial costs for his claim.
B’s expected loss from litigation equals
Vb= pbqb(J+a1+b1) -(1-pb)rbK + (1-pb)(1-rb)(a2+b2)
If A wins both issues of his claim, the defendant has to pay J to the plaintiff, does not get K 
from the plaintiff (he will not file the counterclaim) and has to pay all trial costs of the claim. 
If the plaintiff wins the first issue of his claim but loses the second issue, he loses his claim 
and the defendant will not counterclaim, so the defendant incurs no costs. If the plaintiff loses 
the first issue, the defendant will not have to pay J to the plaintiff and the defendant will win 
his counterclaim with probability rb, in which case he gets K from the plaintiff and incurs no 
trial costs, and will lose his counterclaim with probability 1-rb, in which case he has to pay all 
trial costs of his counterclaim.
In a unitary trial, A will sue if
Va(u) =  paqaJ-pa(1-qa)(a1+b1)-(1-pa)ra(K+a1+a2+b1+b2)-(1-pa)(1-ra)(a1+b1)   0
In a unitary trial, both parties always incur the costs of claim and counterclaim.  If A wins 
both issues of his claim, he gets awarded J, will not have to pay K and pays no trial costs. If 
13
he wins the first issue of his claim but loses the second issue, he loses his claim, gets no award 
J, does not have to pay K (since the defendant will lose the counterclaim) and pays all trial 
costs of his claim. If he loses the first issue, he can not win his own claim and the defendant 
will win his counterclaim with probability ra, in which case the plaintiff has to pay the amount 
of K and all trial costs of claim and counterclaim, and will lose his counterclaim with 
probability 1-ra, in which case the plaintiff only incurs all trial costs of his claim.
B’s expected value equals
Vb(u) = pbqb(J+a1+a2+b1+b2)+pb(1-qb)(a2+b2)-(1-pb)rbK+(1-pb)(1-rb)(a2+b2)
If A wins both issues of his claim, the defendant has to pay J to the plaintiff, does not get K 
from the plaintiff (he will not win the counterclaim) and has to pay all trial costs of claim and 
counterclaim. If the plaintiff wins the first issue of his claim but loses the second issue, he 
loses his claim and the defendant loses the counterclaim, so the defendant only incurs all trial 
costs of the counterclaim. If the plaintiff loses the first issue, the defendant will not have to 
pay J to the plaintiff and the defendant will win his counterclaim with probability rb, in which 
case he gets K from the plaintiff and incurs no trial costs, and will lose his counterclaim with 
probability 1-rb, in which case he has to pay all trial costs of his counterclaim.
A’s incentive to sue under sequential litigation remains the same :
Va=Va(u)
Indeed, the plaintiff does not benefit from litigating sequentially. When he wins his claim in a 
unitary trial, the defendant will not win the counterclaim, and the plaintiff will be 
compensated for his litigation costs of the counterclaim. 
The increase of B’s expected loss equals
Vb-Vb(u) = -pb(a2+b2)
Litigating sequentially is beneficial for the defendant. In the plaintiff wins his claim, the 
defendant escapes having to pay all trial costs of the counterclaim in a sequential trial, 
because he can drop the counterclaim after the plaintiff wins his own claim.  
Sequential litigation decreases the settlement range with
Vb-Va – (Vb(u)-Va(u)) = (Vb-Vb(u))-(Va-Va(u))= -pb(a2+b2)
Since the plaintiff’s minimum settlement demand remains the same and the defendant’s 
maximum settlement offer decreases, the settlement range decreases. 
14
The settlement amount decreases because the defendant saves costs by litigating sequentially 
but the plaintiff’s costs remain unaffected.
3.4. Comparison with sequential litigation under the American rule
Under the American rule, both parties can save costs when they litigate sequentially. If the 
plaintiff wins his claim, both parties escape bearing the trial costs of the counterclaim (the 
defendant will drop the counterclaim). Under the English rule, only the defendant can save 
costs. If the plaintiff wins his claim, the defendant escapes bearing all the trial costs of the
counterclaim because he will drop the counterclaim. The plaintiff saves no costs because the 
defendant bears all the costs of the counterclaim if the plaintiff wins his claim. Consequently,
the plaintiff’s incentive to sue increases under the American rule but not under the English
rule.
The settlement range decreases under both rules of cost allocation. The decrease of the 
settlement range is greater under the American rule than under the English rule. Intuitively, 
under the English rule the reduction of the settlement range only depends on estimation of the 
defendant that the plaintiff will win the issue that claim and counterclaim have in common.  
Under the American rule, the reduction depends on how each party estimates that the plaintiff 
will win the common issue. And since we focus on the situation in which the defendant’s 
estimation that the plaintiff will lose the common issue is greater than the plaintiff’s 
estimation (pa>pb25), the settlement range decreases more under the American rule.26
While the influence on the settlement amount is ambiguous under the American rule, 
this is not true under the English rule: it decreases. The reason is that litigating sequentially 
saves costs for both parties under the American rule, while it only saves costs for the 
defendant under the English rule.
                                               
25 If pa ≤ pb, the parties would have settled the common issue. In that case, there is no difference between a 
unitary and a sequential trial.  
26 The decrease under the American rule equals paa2 + pbb2. If pa>pb, then paa2 + pbb2 > pb(a2+b2). 
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Type II Sequential Trials
AMERICAN RULE                                                         ENGLISH RULE
                      STAGE 1                                                                                STAGE 1
Plaintiff                   Plaintiff                                         Plaintiff                            Plaintiff
      wins                            loses                                            wins                                        loses
END                     STAGE 2                                   END                                     STAGE 2
    Plaintiff and                                                          Defendant avoids                                              
    defendant avoid                                                    trial costs stage 2
    trial costs stage 2
4. Conclusion
The effect of litigating sequentially is less uniform under the English rule than under the 
American rule. Under the American rule, both parties benefit from sequential litigation. Under 
the English rule only one party benefits. Which party this is depends on the type of dispute 
(Type 1 or Type 2). Consequently, the effect of sequential litigation on the total costs of 
litigation may differ sharply for both types of trial. For type 1 trials, sequential litigation 
reduces the litigation costs of individual cases, since stage 2 is not always litigated. On the 
other hand, the total litigation costs of the judicial system may still increase since the 
incentive to sue increases and the incentive to settle decreases. For type 2 trials, sequential 
litigation also reduces the costs of individual cases, but does not increase the incentive to sue
(although it still reduces the incentive to settle). So from a social cost perspective, sequential 
litigation may be more recommendable for type 2 trials than for type 1 trials under the English 
rule.
